

The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett

Release 1.4 ~ May 23, 2005



We are one week from The New Map Game and we wanted to catch you up with some recent developments. There are still a few seats available, so it isn't too late to sign up for this unique event.

The first Gamebook is available for download at <http://www.newmapgame.com/resources.htm>. The book outlines the rules and structure of the game, general background information on the countries that teams will represent, and eleven articles selected by Dr. Barnett that players should try and read before the start of the game. A second Gamebook with even more reference information on the countries will be posted soon.

We are proud to announce our two confirmed lunch speakers for the event. Special guest and presenter Melanie A. Kenderdine, Vice President of the Gas Technology Institute and former Director of the Office of Policy for the Department of Energy, is confirmed to speak as a Policy Commentator. In addition, Stephen F. DeAngelis, President and CEO of Enterra Solutions, will be a special guest and presenter at The New Map Game. Their unique perspectives will compliment Dr. Barnett's briefings and add additional insight.

We are also excited to announce that Greg Jaffe, Pulitzer Prize winning staff reporter for the Wall Street Journal, and James Fallows, National Correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, and other members of the press will be acting as embedded reporters in the teams.

Click www.newmapgame.com to register and to learn more about this groundbreaking event. If you have any questions regarding the nature of the game, please contact Game Director, David Jarvis at david.jarvis@alidade.net.

Contents

[About this Newsletter ...](#) Pg. 3

[Feature: A Picture Worth a Thousand Words ...](#) Pg. 4

[Furthermore: from the *Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog* ...](#) Pg. 12

- [Burning Bridges ...](#) Pg. 5

[Ask Tom ...](#) Pg. 6

- [Paul Niesen ...](#) Pg. 6
- [Ryan R. ...](#) Pg. 7
- [Jim Blair ...](#) Pg. 8
- [A. Howard ...](#) Pg. 10
- [Ron Fisher ...](#) Pg. 11

[Where's Tom? ...](#) Pg. 12

- [The Future in Review \(2005\) ...](#) Pg. 12
- [The New Map Game ...](#) Pg. 12

[Support *The Newsletter From Thomas P.M. Barnett* ...](#) Pg. 13

[Glossary \(Updated April 29, 2005\) ...](#) Pg. 14

[Contents >](#)

About this Newsletter

The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett comprises original material by Tom, commentary from his blog, Esquire contributions, and published books, as well as feedback received via email. It is written and published, based on your feedback.

Ask Tom

You've read *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)*, Tom's blog, or perhaps a published article. You've seen him do the brief – in person, on CSPAN, or DVD. What happens next?

You've got questions.

Suppose, for instance, you have the following question, “Tom, should we be concerned with China as a hegemonious power in Asia?” You can submit the question to:

asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com


The questions and suggestions you submit to Ask Tom drive the publication of this newsletter. Please know that Tom reads each email. Additionally, members of The New Rule Sets Project, LLC assist Tom, per his request. One or more of us will personally respond to your email. The submissions we find most useful to the general understanding of *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)* and *Blueprint for Action (BFA)* will be published in future issues of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett*.

As always, your feedback is appreciated.

Civil Complaints

This issue of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett* has been composed using Microsoft Word 2000. If the online or printed presentation of this document does not meet your needs, please let us know. That is, just asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com.

Feature: A Picture Worth a Thousand Words



by Peter Durand <http://www.alphachimp.com/>

[Contents >](#)

Furthermore: from the *Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog*

Burning bridges

Dateline: in the loft at Nona's, Terre Haute IN, 17 May 2005

Yes, I will confess to being rude in the newsletter article on Kaplan. It's a skill set I mastered in DC years ago and I do it well. I try not to engage in such attack writing unless I feel compelled, and I felt compelled with Kaplan's piece on China.

What Newsweek recently did in its story on interrogations was the journalistic equivalent of yelling "fire" in a crowded theater. People died as a result, and they should answer for this professionally.

What Kaplan does in the *Atlantic Monthly* piece is, in my opinion, basically the same thing--only in slow motion, so to speak. Fear-mongering and war-mongering is reprehensible and morally wrong. If you believe a legitimate case for war exists, like enforcing the global community's emerging rule sets against certain forms of very bad behavior (e.g., Saddam, Kim, Mugabe, etc.), that's one thing. But there's no such argument with China along these lines, and Kaplan does not even seek to make such arguments. Instead, he's just pushing the inevitability argument and trying to plant that seed in the minds of Americans: Get used to thinking about war with China!

Again, I think that position is both terribly wrong in a strategic sense (Kaplan seems to have no understanding of global economics whatsoever, and seems very untroubled by that lack of understanding) and VERY indefensible in a moral sense. Some so-called strategists simply revel in the notions of war and conflict and chaos and suffering, and I think Kaplan is one of them. I personally find that mindset perverse and its application in professional endeavors like high-profile articles of this sort to be morally wrong.

And I don't mind being incredibly rude in pointing that out. In fact, I think it's the only way to go until these types are shouted off the stage.

[Contents >](#)

Ask Tom

In response to “Kaplan’s strategic lap dance for the U.S. Navy and Pacific Command,” featured in last week’s newsletter, May 16, 2005:

Paul Niesen writes:

Dear Critt and Tom,

I've been following the thought processes behind PNM for about 8 months now, not just from professional interest. I must say that I've found merit in your arguments, Tom.

But I must take issue with the tone of delivery. I've always found that the good ideas you have, Tom, start to get lost in the abrasive tone of how you pitch your ideas. Your latest newsletter article about Robert Kaplan's article in the *Atlantic Monthly* was the last straw.

I know that Tom writes as Tom talks - very direct, to the point, pull no punches. That works in a small gathering where listeners are looking for candid exchange. It's less effective in a book, as the tone may direct readers away from your message. But to publicly lambaste a peer in a newsletter - even if it's your newsletter, and whether or not the remarks are deserved - that's another thing altogether.

There are times I will disagree with my peers on various issues - and that's OK, because open dialog of opposing ideas is how we all grow. If the material we're discussing was poorly written, poorly researched, or I violently disagreed with it, I would certainly bring it to the attention of the other person...in private. Use a personal letter, an e-mail to the person, or even a phone call. Certainly - not in such a public forum as what you used.

But it's not just that, Tom; it's the manner in which you deliver your remarks. This was arrogant...mocking, demeaning, and decidedly unprofessional. To repeatedly say things like "I don't think I've heard anything more stupid in my entire life" and "downright dumbass" - please...that's gone too far. If you were looking for impact, I think you've succeeded...kind of like a garbage bag of vegetable soup hitting the sidewalk after a ten-story fall...

But here's more impact, Tom - you've lost a strong supporter in me because of your remarks and the tone of delivery of the same. I expect more out of a best-selling author, a PhD, and a fellow Badger. If my advice means anything to you, I offer this: Clean up your delivery, and stow the arrogance...it's unbecoming and unprofessional. Perhaps your fan base likes that "in your face," Howard Stern-like writing style. I know I speak for others when I say that I don't.

Good luck with your second book... Given the tone of what I've read of late, I know I won't be buying a copy, certainly won't recommend it, and after what I read in your latest newsletter, I'm not sure now that I really even want one.

Sincerely,

Paul G. Niesen

Ryan R writes:

Subject: practical globalization

I've been extremely impressed with your writing and blog ever since I saw you on C-SPAN last year. I greatly appreciate the objective approach you take to globalization.

I am a big supporter of globalization, but I try to resolve my beliefs in context with other negative interpretations of a new world order that's been attempted throughout history.

Perhaps you'd be interested in reading *The Real New World Order: A Practical Guide to Revolutionary Globalization*. I outlined 5 key basic points and I was curious if you agreed, as a global strategist and Democrat, with my premise and concepts of positive globalization. It's available at - <http://unitedelite.net/realnwo.html>

The crux of my understanding was formulated from an article in the Bush Sr. Presidential Library entitled *The New World Order in Theory and Practice* (<http://unitedelite.net/bush.html>) and in Colonel House's foreign policy of his Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (<http://unitedelite.net/house.html>). It is particularly interesting considering the CFR now says that Bush and his neoconservative philosophy is congruent to hard-Wilsonianism, the de facto foreign policy of uber globalist Colonel House.

Good luck on the new book, I can't wait to read it.

Tom responds:

Dear Ryan,

I will confess that I don't read much beyond my regular newspapers simply because the crush of travel and my commitment to the blog mean I have to budget my time awfully strictly to avoid having my kids forget who I am.

But discerning what I can from your email, I think it's best to avoid the emphasis on party identities and perceived irony. The turn the Bushies have taken has little to do with classic Republican values, but rather with George's own values and the world he found himself operating within following 9/11. I don't see the Gap as being either a Democrats' or Republicans' issue or problem. As soon as a Dem is back in the White House, expect the GOP to back track considerably on all this aggressive internationalism, labeling it all a "do-gooding Democratic plot to impose one-world government, elevate the UN, and tax the poor American people beyond belief for their dreams of social working the planet to death."

This will be as disingenuous as current Dem descriptions of the Bush White House as war mongering to the point of approximating Nazi Germany, the current apogee of idiotic hyperbole.

People like to label so they can affect a cure, so to speak, and there is no cure for the Gap save for shrinking it out of existence. We always want to make global affairs all about ourselves, our character, our history, etc. It isn't. We're furthest along in this grand experiment called globalization, but that process is increasingly defined by others, like Asia, so putting it all down in terms of Wilsonian this, or Jacksonian that, is a sport best left to academics in their own islands of unreality. I say, resist the temptation!

Thanks for the question.

+++++

Jim Blair, Major (USAR, mobilized in Support of OIF, with assignment in Kuwait) and President of Aberdeen Inc. Madison, Wisconsin writes:

Subject: Implementing change in the military through the promotion system

Tom,

This is a quick one for you. Input on changing the promotion system. This might have some merit for consideration in your future work. For me, it is therapy for what I have witnessed in my 6 ½ months since being deployed.

The need for us to unify the forces is extremely compelling, in Kuwait for example, I have observed countless turf battles between the different services, which all come back to being a waste of time and energy and create unnecessary conflict between the different services. I could digress on this issue if you don't already have enough examples from your own experience.

In your earlier work, you have mentioned the need for officers who reach the flag rank to be purple, this is an idea that I have heard a lot of endorsement for when discussions take place within my peer group. There is one other change that needs to be made to the promotion and evaluation system. As you know, the rating system in place for Officers and NCO's has a Rater, Intermediate Rater and a Senior Rater. Unfortunately individuals move forward without the system policing them up which has caused a lot of angst here. Part of this is due to demand to keep strength up in the reserves, almost as if quantity is better than quality? I would propose you consider the impact of change in the NCO and Officer Corps, and the services overall if we implemented a peer rating system that complimented the current system. We have to police our ranks better to ensure the best and brightest advance to leadership positions. In the active force this might not be as much an issue as it would be in the reserve element, but irregardless, the System Admin Force you propose needs to have competent leaders. If your peers can influence your advancement, then I would submit that there would be better communication between the various staff sections in an organization as you would not be able to be an independent operator. The use of peer system input into evaluations is occurring in the corporate world and allows individuals the opportunity to provide feedback to peers, it would benefit the military by giving our commissioned and non-commissioned officers some

responsibility for policing our ranks to ensure the best move ahead and those that do not want to continue to grow and accept greater responsibility are weeded out.

What I have witnessed is the officer corps has failed to police itself better, primarily reserve component personnel, to ensure we promote capable leaders. The current system has disparity when you compare the school house to the field (operational) assignments rating system. In all of our professional development, we get input from our peer group as to where we fit in amongst our peers, but in operational assignments it is not factor. I think this is important because what I observe most often is a failure for staffs to interact and share information, I believe this could be avoided or minimized with the addition of a peer rating system added. Furthermore, I believe all officers would be more inclined to communicate with their peers in the sharing of information; which would lead to better operational planning and more capable leaders being advanced in the system.

Change is painful for this organization, as you have so eloquently stated in your prior works. We need a system perturbation in our evaluation systems, as much as, our promotion systems for change to occur.

Hope your day is going well! By the way, thanks for the re-take on the newsletter concept, I especially liked your comments on dispelling WW IV in the recent newsletter.

Jim Blair

Tom responds:

Jim,

What a brilliant observation and what a great email!

I had no idea on the lack of peer review in operational assignments. This is a crucial step forward for the military as a whole but especially for an Army that is scraping a division structure and reformatting itself progressively into much smaller "brigade units of action" that effecting return it to the frontier model of more than a century ago. This is a truly profound and transformational shift in personnel and structure for the Army, but it reflects the undeniable reality of the international security environment, or what I call the split between Core and Gap.

If the world is all Core or if the Core is all we care about in terms of security, then the division structure survives, but if the Gap is the new strategic "market," then the logic of the more flexible, frontier army model becomes supreme. To me, what General Pete Schoomaker (Army Chief of Staff), whom I had the privilege of interviewing at length recently, is doing right now is a huge proof of the Gap concept. Schoomaker has never read PNM (although many in his office have and made that point to me when I was there) and yet he adheres to the logic instinctively because that is simply the global strategic environment he finds himself dealing with (as I always say: PNM is not about influence but accuracy).

Your information is truly welcome, and I thank you for sending it. All I can offer in return is to point out the experiments in the US Navy under Admiral Vern Clark (whom I also interviewed recently) with an E-bay-like auctioning of posts online, demonstrating that the Pentagon is radically rethinking the notion of career management and effectively moving in the direction of killing detailing career paths from above. The networked work force is finally going to be married up to the networked warfighting force.

So stay optimistic if you can.

+++++

From A. Howard:

Dr. Barnett,

You have frequently criticized *New York Times* writer Thomas Friedman about his "geo-green" arguments towards the Middle East. He says getting off reliance on foreign oil will force the Middle East to more quickly join the global economy by producing things other than oil, invest in education, improve infrastructure, etc. Do you dislike the premise because it is an approach that is "too fast" for them or is there more about it you don't like?

Tom responds:

You hit in on the head: too fast, too antagonistic, and too unrealistic in its expectations of forcing change—both at home and over there.

It's just a bad argument in my mind, and an unnecessary one. The shift off oil for transportation will be led by the New Core, not the Old Core, so China and India, not Europe and the U.S. It will be driven by the rapid rise of a car culture in these states, coupled by overwhelming pollution problems.

For the U.S. to turn its security role in globalization's spread into this defensive crouch is just plain non-strategic. I think Friedman is a brilliant journalist, but not a strategist. To me, it's just plain scary when the Pentagon or the White House takes any cues from journalists about their grand strategic objectives in security. Stick to what you know, and grow that capacity from within. Let journalists be journalists, and grand strategists be grand strategists and warfighters be warfighters. Don't mix and match and pretend it makes sense.

+++++

Ron Fisher, Fisher Technology writes:

Mr. Barnett,

I am curious as to what role the widespread deployment of technology at a mass consumer level plays for moving states up the food chain, as it were. Is technology a result or a cause? Is there any relationship at all? Is there a point of cultural "diminishing returns," where technological advancement doesn't really affect social development?

Thanks for PNM, and am looking forward to the new book!

Ron Fisher

Tom responds:

Dear Ron,

Such technology can be huge, although we are likely to be surprised by how that works, as we always are.

To me, the key will be cellphones, not computers, because it gets around constant electricity demands and illiteracy. So I'd like to see Core aid to the Gap push this sort of simple connectivity, along with the private sector, as much as possible. Me, I would have an aid program that sought to put a cellphone in everyone's hand inside the Gap, and then just sit back and watch all that humanity surprise me with its ingenuity.

Thanks for your note.

[Contents >](#)

Where's Tom?



Future in Review 2005
at the Hotel del Coronado in San Diego
May 23-26, 2005

<https://www.tapsns.com/fire/index.php>

Wednesday, May 25, 2005

11:00am - 11:30am "Future U.S. Military Strategy": a conversation with Thomas Barnett, author of "*The Pentagon's New Map*"; hosted by Dave Davison



The New Map Game
At the Hyatt Regency in Newport
May 31-June 2, 2005
<http://www.newmapgame.com/gameplay.htm>

[Contents >](#)

Support *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett*

- Order *The Pentagon's New Map* from Amazon ([Hardcover](#)) or ([Paperback](#)).
- Order [Blueprint for Action](#) from Amazon.
- Participate in The New Map Game.



www.newmapgame.com

- [Buy a map poster of *The Pentagon's New Map* from the Everything Else Store at Amazon.](#)



[Contents >](#)

Glossary

updated 29 April 2005

Asymmetrical warfare — A conflict between two foes of vastly different capabilities. After the Red Army dissolved in the 1990s, the U.S. military knew it was basically unbeatable, especially in a straight-up fight. But that meant that much smaller opponents would seek to negate its strengths by exploiting its weaknesses, by being clever and “dirty” in combat. On, 9/11, America got a real dose of what asymmetrical warfare is going to be like in the twenty-first century.

Connectivity — The enormous changes being brought on by the Information Revolution, including the emerging financial, technological and logistical architecture of the global economy (i.e., the movement of money, services accompanied by content, and people and materials). During the boom times of the 1990s, many thought that advances in communications such as the Internet and mobile phones would trump all, erasing the business cycle, erasing national borders, erasing the very utility of the state in managing a global security order that seemed more virtual than real. 9/11 proved differently: that connectivity, while a profoundly transforming force, could not by itself maintain global security, primarily because a substantial rise in connectivity between any nation and the outside world typically leads to a host of tumultuous reactions, including heightened nationalism.

Disconnectedness — In this century, it is disconnectedness that defines danger. Disconnectedness allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their dictatorial control, or, in the case of failed states, it allows dangerous transnational actors to exploit the resulting chaos to their own dangerous ends. Eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a supreme moral cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will. Just as importantly, however, by expanding the connectivity of globalization, we increase peace and prosperity planet-wide.

Functioning Core — Those parts of the world that are actively integrating their national economies into a global economy, and that adhere to globalization’s emerging security rule set. The Functioning Core at present consists of North America, Europe both “old” and “new,” Russia, Japan and South Korea, China (although the interior far less so), India (in a pockmarked sense), Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, and the ABCs of South American (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). That is roughly four billion out of a global population of just over six billion. The Functioning Core can be subdivided into the Old Core, anchored by America, Europe, and Japan; and the New Core, whose leading pillars are China, India, Brazil and Russia.

Globalization — The worldwide integration and increasing flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people. Until 9/11, the U.S. government tended to identify globalization primarily as an economic rule set, but thanks to the Global War on Terrorism, we now

understand that it likewise demands the clear enunciation and enforcement of a security rule set as well.

Globalization I, II, and III — The history of globalization can be divided into three parts, each governed by its own rule set.

Globalization I, from 1870 to 1914, was ended by the start of World War I.

Globalization II, from 1945 to 1980, was initiated by the United States at the end of World War II, and continued until the effective end of the Cold War.

Globalization III (1980 -2001) has been an era of relative peace and enormous economic growth around the world that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but whose rule sets have now been challenged by rogue states and international terrorists, as exemplified by 9/11.

Greater inclusive — What we need to create as we expand our definition of national security crises in the age of globalization. After more than half a century of almost complete isolation from the rest of the world as it sought to guard against the terror of nuclear war, the Pentagon needs to reconnect to the world—to war within the context of everything else. We need to break up the old hierarchies between the “big one” and all the lesser included. We need something that covers the whole enchilada—that makes us one with everything. We need a greater inclusive.

Lesser included — Pentagon long-range planning during the Cold War had been very simple: always keep our forces ahead of the Soviets by matching the size of their forces and pursuing the latest technological advances. World War III constituted the “Big One” against which all long-range planning proceeded. Everything else the U.S. military did in terms of operations around the world was bundled together in the concept of the “lesser included.” Even though the U.S. military spent over ninety percent of the Cold War engaged in such lesser included, its force-sizing principle remained the Big One with the Soviets. The forces of globalization and 9/11 made clear that there wasn’t going to be a Big One—the lesser included were the whole ball game.

Leviathan — The U.S. military's unparalleled warfighting capacity and the high-performance combat troops, weapon systems, aircraft, armor and ships associated with all-out war against traditionally defined opponents (i.e., other militaries). This is the force America created to defend the West against the Soviet threat, now transformed from its industrial era roots to its information age capacity for high-speed, high-lethality, and high-precision combat operations. This force is without peer in the world today, and—as such—frequently finds itself fighting shorter and easier wars. However, this “overmatch” means that current and future enemies in the Global War on Terrorism will largely seek to avoid triggering the Leviathan's employment, preferring to wage asymmetrical war against the United States. The Leviathan rules the “first half” of war, but is often ill-suited, by design and temperament, to the “second half” of peace, to

include postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. It is thus counterposed to the System Administrators force.

Military-Market Nexus — Markets create connectivity, and military security is needed for markets to take root and flourish. “Where security enables the steady rise of connectivity between any national economy and the outside world, markets logically emerge to manage the marginal risks that remain, and where markets can effectively manage risk, investments invariably flow toward desired resources, such as relatively inexpensive but dependable labor. Over time, these essential transactions engender further connectivity among nations and regions, reflected in the rise of more complex and suitably entangling rule sets that moderate the behavior of not just nation-states but likewise firms and individuals. The desired security end state of this integration process is a community of states within which rule-set transgressions find certain—if not immediate—resolution through universally agreed-upon legal means. In other words, the military never has to get involved.” *The Pentagon’s New Map*, Pg 198.

Military operations other than war — How the Pentagon defines crisis response activity, nation-building, peacekeeping, and so forth—everything outside of major warfare. Abbreviated MOOTW (pronounced “moo-twah”), it held a very low priority before 9/11.

Non-Integrating Gap — Regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability. Today, the Non-Integrating Gap is made up of the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, portions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia. These regions constitute globalization’s “ozone hole,” where connectivity remains thin or absent in far too many cases. Of course, each region contains some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just like there are Gap-like pockets throughout the Gap defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances.

Rule Sets — A collection of rules (both formal and informal) that delineates how some activity normally unfolds. The Pentagon’s New Map explored the new rule sets concerning conflict and violence in international affairs—or under what conditions governments decide it makes sense to switch from the rule set that defines peace to that which defines war. The events of 9/11 shocked the Pentagon and the rest of the world into the realization that we needed a new rule set concerning war and peace, one that replaces the old rule set that governed America’s Cold War with the Soviet Union. The book explained how the new rule set will actually work in the years ahead, not just from America’s perspective but from an international one.

Rule set reset — When a crisis triggers your realization that your world is woefully lacking certain types of rules, you start making up those new rules with a vengeance (e.g., the Patriot Act and the doctrine of preemption following 9/11). Such a rule set reset can be a very good thing. But it can also be a very dangerous time, because in your rush to fill in all the rule set gaps, your cure may end up being worse than your disease.

Seam states — The countries that ring the Gap, such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Some are already members of the Core, and most others are serious candidates for joining the Core. These states are important with regard to international security because they provide terrorists geographic access to the Core. The U.S. security strategy regarding these states is simple: get them to increase their security practices as much as possible and to close whatever loopholes exist.

System Administrators (SysAdmin) — The "second half" force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has waged war successfully. Therefore it is a force optimized for such categories of operations as "stability and support operations" (SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, "military operations other than war (MOOTW), "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief" (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counter-insurgency operations, and small-scale crisis responses.

System perturbations — A system-level definition of crisis and instability in the age of globalization; a new ordering principle that has already begun to transform the military and U.S. security policy; also a particular event that forces us to rethink everything. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 served as the first great "existence proof" for this concept, but there have and will be others over time (some are purposeful, like the Bush Administration's "Big Bang" strategy of fomenting political change in the Middle East by toppling Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, but others will be accidents, like the SARS epidemic or the Asian Tsunamis of December 2004). 9/11, as a system perturbation, placed the world's security rule set in flux and created a demand for new rules. Preemption is the big new rule. By creating that new rule, 9/11 changed America forever and through that process altered global history.